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Much of contemporary mainstream formal grammar theory is unable to provide analyses
for language as it occurs in actual spoken interaction. Its analyses are developed for a
cleaned up version of language which omits the disfluencies, non-sentential utterances,
gestures, and many other phenomena that are ubiquitous in spoken language. Using
evidence from linguistics, conversation analysis, multimodal communication, psychology,
language acquisition, and neuroscience, we show these aspects of language use are rule
governed in much the same way as phenomena captured by conventional grammars.
Furthermore, we argue that over the past few years some of the tools required to
provide a precise characterizations of such phenomena have begun to emerge in
theoretical and computational linguistics; hence, there is no reason for treating them
as “second class citizens” other than pre-theoretical assumptions about what should fall
under the purview of grammar. Finally, we suggest that grammar formalisms covering
such phenomena would provide a better foundation not just for linguistic analysis of
face-to-face interaction, but also for sister disciplines, such as research on spoken
dialogue systems and/or psychological work on language acquisition.
Keywords: interaction and the competence/performance distinction, semantics of dialogue, non-sentential
utterances, self-repair and other-repair, quotation, gestures and multimodal grammar
1. INTRODUCTION
What should grammars characterize?
Historically, grammars were developed with written language in mind, and providing analyses
for examples from written text was the standard task for grammarians. But following Saussure and
the American structuralists, inter alii, spoken language became a reputable object of study as well.
This trend should have strengthened with the rise of generative grammar, whose avowed aim was
characterizing the universals underlying linguistic competence, thus not only in cultures in which
written language plays a core role in verbal communication, but also in cultures where only spoken
language is used–e.g., tribesmen speaking Pirahã in the Amazon or Arapesh in Papua New Guinea.
And yet in practice contemporary theoretical linguistics is typically not interested or able to
provide analyses for the rules governing language as it occurs in actual spoken interaction. Its
analyses are developed for a cleaned up version of language [e.g., (1b) for the case of (1a)], which
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omits the disfluencies , interjections, overlapping turns, non-
sentential utterances, and ad hoc coinages which are ubiquitous
in spoken language, as exemplified in (1)–(3):
(1) a. I’m just really anxious, not anxious, anxious is
the wrong word, I’m excited about tomorrow. (Roy
Hodgson, England Football manager, The Guardian, 10
October, 2013)
b. I’m excited about tomorrow.
(2) 1. A: and they took a bit of my bone away, also in the
process, cos it was so like crck crrck (ad hoc coinage)
2. B: what did they put there instead?
3. A: didn’t put anything!
4. A: it was a huge, it was a big hole it was (disfluency)
5. B: what’s there now?
6. A: huh? (interjection)
7. B: what is what’s in your mouth now?
8. A: there’s nothing, I have like this this (disfluency)
9. A: this piece of gum that’s, that you know erm
(disfluency)
it’s just sort of gummed back together
(From the corpus described in Healey et al. (2015)).
(3) 1. Fri: They still haven’t figured out, (.) how they’re
gonna get to the country: < who’s gonna take care of
huh m:othah while [they’re- y’know ’p in the country.
on the weekend.(disfluency)
2. Dav: [Mm (0.2 secs)(non-sentential utterance)
3. Fri: So: (.) you know, (0.8 secs)
4. Fri: an besides tha[:t,
5. Rub: [You c’n go any[way
6. Dav: [Don - Don git- don [get](disfluency)
7. Fri: [they] won t be:
8. Dav: Y know there- there s no- no long explanation is
necessary (disfluency)
9. Fri: Oh noon no: (interjection), (disfluency)
I’m not- I jus: : uh-wanted: you to know that you can go
up anyway.= (overlapping turns)
10. Rub:=Yeah:. (0.1 secs)(non-sentential utterance)
11. Fri: You know. (0.2 secs)
12. Fri: Because-ah (3.3 secs) (disfluency)
13. Rub: They don mind honey they’re jus not gonna
talk to us ever again.= (overlapping turns)
14. Dav: = (laughter) / ri:(h)ight) (non-sentential
utterance)
(From Schegloff (2001)).
This written language bias (Linell, 2005) characterizes work
in most contemporary grammatical formalisms, from the
Minimalist Programme (Chomsky, 1995) to Head-driven Phrase
Structure Grammar (HPSG) (Pollard and Sag, 1994; Ginzburg
and Sag, 2000; Sag et al., 2003) to Lexical Functional Grammar
(Bresnan, 1982, 2001) to Categorial Grammar (Moortgat, 1997;
Steedman, 2001) to Construction Grammar (Goldberg, 1995; Kay
and Fillmore, 1999), though, as we shall see, there has certainly
been work in some of these frameworks that very directly engages
with spoken language.
For some frameworks the bias is explicitly justified, given
continued adherence to Chomsky’s competence/performance
distinction (Chomsky, 1965) and to a view of grammar as
‘the capacity for unbounded composition of various linguistic
objects into complex structures . . . This approach distinguishes
the biological capacity for language from its many possible
functions, such as communication or internal thought’ (Hauser
et al., 2014). Accordingly, some grammarians attempted to
delineate core phenomena the grammar needs to account for,
in contrast to a periphery (Chomsky, 1981)1. However, this
strategy seems to have little independent justification (Jackendoff,
2005). Another strategy is to cleanly separate processing
within the sentence and discourse–oriented processing: see
e.g., Frazier and Clifton (2005). But such a strategy, whatever
its merits, is not helpful for dealing with various pervasive
within–sentence conversational phenomena such as disfluencies
and interjections, exemplified above and discussed below. In
other cases, less commitment has been explicitly made as
to what empirical phenomena grammars need to account
for.
The competence/performance distinction was introduced, in
part, as a means of providing a justification for formal grammars,
formal systems that abstract away from describing language
in an interactive setting. A formal grammar, on this view, is
taken to provide a theory of grammaticality: such a theory
is tested via subjects’ intuitions about the forms of a given
language abstracted away from their occurrence in conversation.
A theory of performance arises by somehow integrating the
formal grammar with a parser/generator and a theory of
context. One consequence of this has been to exclude from
“competence” certain phenomena which intrinsically involve
conversational use (though as we will see in Section 2, this
exclusion has not been executed in a principled way). One
major claim we make in this paper is that grammars need to
aim to analyze all aspects of language use—in other words,
we subscribe to the early Chomsky’s claim that “The behavior
of the speaker, listener, and learner of language constitutes, of
course, the actual data for any study of language.” (Chomsky,
1959, p. 56). Just as physics takes responsibility for explaining all
physical phenomena without restricting itself to, e.g., frictionless
abstractions, and biologists do not put to one side duck billed
platypuses or non-kin oriented altruism, grammars cannot pick
and choose.
Over the past 40 years important contributions by researchers
in conversation analysis, cognitive and social psychology (e.g.,
Hymes, 1972; Allwood, 1976; Schegloff et al., 1977; Levelt,
1993; Clark, 1996; Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Linell, 2009).
have highlighted that competence needs to be stated within
a conversationally oriented view of language (see also Ono
and Thompson, 1995). While this research has yielded many
important insights, some of which are mentioned below, it
1 Frazier (2014) proposes a somewhat related strategy whereby in addition to the
standard competence grammar, there exists a repair system which functions as an
automatic speech error reversal system where the repaired meaning is plausible
and fits with presumed intent of the speaker.
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has for the most part not been formulated within formal
frameworks of grammar or cognition. Nor has it developed
a precise theory of the structure and dynamics of context in
conversation. This has allowed the impression to be conveyed
that the various phenomena uncovered in this research cannot
or should not be described within theories of grammar similar
to those used to describing the more traditional ‘cleaned up’
grammatical phenomena. In Section 3 we provide empirical
evidence that the interaction-free notion of grammaticality
cannot be maintained: on the one hand, phenomena such as
quotation and repair can “save” forms that would be rejected in a
non-conversational setting; conversely, cross-turn constructions
such as various kinds of non-sentential utterances can be well-
formed when adjudged outside a conversational context but
their parallelism requirements (e.g., cross-turn case matching)
requires their acceptability to be judged relative to a context,
or as we will prefer to say, relative to an interaction situation.
Phenomena such as these cannot be explained within standard
conceptions of grammar, or interaction–free conceptions of
grammar, as we will call them; these are therefore intrinsically
incomplete. One needs grammars that can encode a view
of compositionality wherein meaning emerges by combining
information from the interaction situation, speech events, and
gestures.
But what are the prospects for a formal grammar to be used
to analyze language as it occurs in actual spoken interaction?
In the paper we make two further claims. First, we argue in
Section 5 that whereas no single “Interaction Grammar” yet
exists, recent work in theoretical and computational linguistics
has shown that one can develop precise accounts of most of the
“conversational phenomena” we discuss of a rigor comparable
to those found in typical formal grammars. Second, we show
that from this work several fundamental constraints emerge that
need to be satisfied by any grammatical framework in which
such accounts are formulated. These conditions necessarily
change the nature of all the existing major frameworks we are
aware of.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we
briefly discuss some phenomena whose meaning turns out
to be intrinsically interactive and which modern grammatical
frameworks have treated, though typically without interfacing
with a detailed treatment of context. In Section 3 we present
linguistic evidence supporting the contention that interaction–
free grammar will not work for spoken language, based on
an analysis of a wide variety of ubiquitous constructions.
In Section 4, we consider evidence from other disciplines
that study language, specifically language acquisition and
cognitive neuroscience. We argue that this evidence either
supports an interaction-oriented view of grammar or is
problematic for interaction–free approaches. Section 5 presents
the key theoretical notions and constraints on “interaction
grammars” that are beginning to emerge from various theoretical
proposals; in particular, it includes sketchy accounts, in
different formalisms, of all the phenomena discussed in
Section 3. Finally, in Section 6 we briefly discuss the
implications of our proposal for linguistics and other behavioral
sciences.
2. INTERACTIONAL ASPECTS OF
COMMUNICATION ALREADY ACCEPTED
AS PART OF GRAMMATICAL
COMPETENCE
It is worth stressing that in fact modern linguistic theory
already accepts that grammatical competence governs some ways
of communicating information that are only encountered in
interaction, from intonation to gestures, and in particular purely
gestural forms of communication such as sign language2. In
addition, it is generally accepted that at least some form of
reference to the Interaction Situation, so-called deictic reference,
are governed by grammar.
2.1. Intonation
It has long been accepted by modern linguistic theory that
(some aspects of) this signal are regulated by sentence level
grammar in that they interact with the meaning introduced by
words and phrases (see e.g., Jackendoff, 1972; Sgall et al., 1973;
Krifka, 1992; Rooth, 1993; Erteschik-Shir, 2007 among many).
Crucially, some of the meaning conveyed by intonation seem
to be irreducibly interaction oriented—the fall-rise intonation
contour [the sequence of tones L(ow)H(igh) in autosegmental
theory] associated with theme/ground in English is explicated
as, roughly speaking, presupposing a certain issue being under
discussion, whereas the nuclear pitch accent associated with
focus/rheme (the high tone H) as introducing information new
for the addressee (see e.g., Roberts, 1996; Steedman, 2014 for
detailed accounts); similarly, the French non-falling contours
(a sequence ending with an H*) is used when the message
conveyed is assumed to involve controversy between speaker and
addressee (Beyssade and Marandin, 2007). There is considerable
evidence that languages express similar meanings via word order
(e.g., Catalan, Vallduví, 1992, Greek, Alexopoulou and Kolliakou,
2002), meaning that word order is also implicated interactionally.
There are various attempts to integrate such notions into most
modern grammatical frameworks (e.g., HPSG, Engdahl and
Vallduví, 1996, LFG, Dalrymple and Mycock, 2011, Minimalism,
Zubizarreta, 1998). For the most part, these do not interface with
representations of context, but see Steedman (2014) for such an
account with Combinatory Categorial Grammar and (Vallduví,
2016) for a detailed account of all notions of information
structure cast in terms of dialogical context.
2.2. Deixis
One type of reference to the Interaction Situation that is generally
accepted to be governed by grammar is the information coming
from pointing. In the account of demonstratives of Kaplan
(1978), for instance, every demonstrative d is accompanied by
a demonstration δ—e.g., a pointing gesture–and the grammar
provides a semantics for d[δ] jointly: specifically, d[δ] is a directly
referential term that designates the demonstratum of δ in context
c. This account has been widely adopted in modern formal
2Of course, as an anonymous reviewer reminds us, this applies with equal force
to scholars who do not accept the competence/performance distinction, who
would presumably not dispute the importance of developing a grammar for such
phenomena.
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semantics. But the idea that the role of the Interaction Situation
in the semantics of demonstratives could be entirely abstracted
away through the notion of demonstration is open to significant
challenge, as we discuss in Section 3.5.
2.3. Gestures
There is considerable evidence that in face-to-face conversation,
verbal information is integrated with information from a variety
of gestures in addition to pointing (Kendon, 1980; McNeill, 1992;
Bavelas and Chovil, 2000; Kendon, 2004). Kendon (2004) charts
the fall and rise in the scientific and scholarly status of gestures:3
gestures were seen in traditional Rhetoric as a key component
of human utterance and public performance. However, gestures
lost their status sometime during the nineteenth century—in part
because of a shift toward amore controlled style of public delivery
in which gestures played less of a role, in part because the printed
word came to be seen as the truest form of language expression.
This decline in status of gestures was paralleled by a reduced
interest in this form of expression in linguistics. Linguists came
to question the extent to which the contribution of gestures
ought to be considered part of grammar, arguing instead that
the role of gestures is purely depictive or pantomimic. In the
last 30 years, however, thanks also to technological advances
in recording and analyzing videos that have enabled extensive
and detailed empirical investigations, gestures have come to be
recognized again as a key component of human utterance.
Studies of the relation of gesture and speech using such
audio-visual methodology have shown the two activities to be so
intimately correlated that they appear to be governed by a single
process, as emphasized by the pioneering work of Kendon and
McNeill in particular. Recent research e.g., in the ToGoG project
has provided evidence that a number of gestures have undergone
a process of grammaticalization (Bressem and Ladewig, 2011;
Schoonjans, 2013). There is also psychological evidence that
such information is immediately integrated (e.g., Ozyurek et al.,
2007). It has thus become clear that both gesture and speech
make essential contributions to referential meaning, so that one
form of expression cannot be considered as primary (Kendon,
2004). One example is head-shaking and other gestures used to
express negation (Kendon, 2002; González-Fuente et al., 2015). A
formal treatment of gestural negation and its grammatical role–in
particular, its scope–has been provided by, e.g., Harrison (2010).
More generally, recent years have witnessed the development of
so-called multimodal grammars, which provide an integrated
account of both the spoken and the gestural aspect of human
utterance (Johnston et al., 1997; Lascarides and Stone, 2009;
Poesio and Rieser, 2009; Alahverdzhieva and Lascarides, 2010;
Fricke, 2013).
2.4. Sign Language
Virtually all theoretical linguists view sign language as being
governed by the same kind of grammar that governs verbal forms
of communication (Newport and Supalla, 1999). Accounts of,
e.g., the grammar of pronominal anaphora, or the tense system of
several sign languages have been proposed that utilize the same
3This summary is based on Kendon (2004), chapters 3–5.
ingredients of standard generative grammar (see e.g., Zucchi,
2012).
Like the accounts of the grammatical role of gestures discussed
above, such accounts abstract away from references to the
Interaction Situation. But much the same issues arise with such
abstraction as with the abstraction proposed for the role of
pointing gestures in deixis. Indeed, the exact same issues arise for
the proposed accounts of anaphoric reference in sign language.
Anaphoric pronouns are usually expressed in sign language by
pointing to the spatial locations where the antecedents have been
signed. For example, while in English sentence (4) below (Lillo-
Martin and Klima, 1991) the relation the pronouns he and him
bear to their antecedents is not overtly marked and needs to be
inferred from extra-linguistic clues, in American Sign Language
(ASL) the corresponding sentence is disambiguated by the loci
of the pronouns: the locations in space to which the index finger
points. If the index points to the location where the sign JOHN
was signed, then JOHN is the antecedent of the pronoun, while if
the index points to the location where the sign BILL was signed,
BILL is the antecedent of the pronoun.
(4) John called Bill a Republican and then he insulted him.
Clearly, the same questions raised with respect to pointing apply
to the case of loci identification.
2.5. Beyond
In the rest of the paper we argue that there is no principled
dividing line between phenomena such as intonation and deixis,
widely accepted as falling within the purview of (competence)
grammar, and the phenomena we review in Section 3. Given the
need to accommodate the former within grammar, this entails a
similar conclusion for the latter. This, in turn, requires a view of
grammar embedded in interaction, a move which will also lead to
a more principled account of ‘information structure’ phenomena.
3. MUCH OF OUR GRAMMATICAL
COMPETENCE CONCERNS LANGUAGE
USE IN INTERACTION: LINGUISTIC
EVIDENCE
In this section we demonstrate that many pervasive aspects of
spoken and written language use are subject to grammatical
constraints that cannot be described in interaction-free terms.
They show that grammaticality has to be relativized to interaction
situations. The phenomena we discuss fall under five broad
categories:
a. Grammatical constraints across conversational turns:
parallelism constraints on multiple linguistic levels whose
scope ranges across participant turns.
b. Interaction Situation reference: the existence of systematic,
conventionalized dependencies that make explicit,
unavoidable reference to the interaction situation.
c. Online repair: repair phenomena that take place while the
utterance is in progress and lead to non-monotonic effects in
structure and content construction.
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d. Genre dependence: the impossibility of maintaining a global
grammar.
e. Speech-gesture integration: the need to integrate speech and
gesture in content construction.
3.1. Grammatical Constraints across
Conversational Turns
3.1.1. Greeting
In a wide variety of languages there exist words and phrases
whose conventional meaning requires making non-eliminable
reference to the existence of a conversation, indeed to the
fine structure of a conversation. Greeting words like English
‘hi,’ ‘hello,’4 ‘good morning’ must occur conversation–initially
or as responses to an immediately prior greeting by another
conversationalist. And many languages have more fine grained
systems: e.g., Syrian and Lebanese Arabic, where ‘sabah. elxeyr,’
‘marh. aba,’ and ‘bonjour’ occur conversation–initially, whereas
‘sabah. elnur,’ ‘marh. abteyn,’ and ‘bonjoureyn’ can only be used as
responses to these greetings, respectively (Ferguson, 1967):
(5) a. (#) A: sabah. elxeyr B: sabah. elnur.
(#) A: morning def-good B: morning def-light
‘ A: Good morning B: Good morning’
b. (#) A: marh. aba B: marh. abteyn.
(#) A: hello B: hello-dual
‘ A: Hello B: Hello’
c. (#) A: Bonjour B: Bonjoureyn.
(#) A: hello B: hello-dual
‘ A: Hello B: Hello’.
These facts, which require direct reference to conversational
structure, need to be registered in some way in the lexical entries
of such words. Thus, very similar argumentation to that used
by syntacticians to motivate various notions of (intra-sentential)
syntactic dependence e.g., cliticisation and complementation
could be used to motivate the need for a mechanism that can
capture the fact that words like ‘sabah. elnur’ and ‘marh. abteyn’
can only be used as responses to greetings.
3.1.2. Parting
By the same token, a wide variety of languages have words
and phrases whose conventional meaning involves parting.
Parting is more complex than greeting—it involves making the
judgment that a non-negligible amount of interaction has taken
place (Ginzburg, 2012). As with greetings, there exist languages
where the parting expression has presuppositions about the
form of a preceding parting phrase: in Syrian Arabic, for
instance, ‘Allah ya’afik’ requires as preceding utterance the parting
phrase ‘ya’atik el’afiye.’(Ferguson, 1967)5. This indicates that such
4 ‘Hello’ has an ironic use (‘Are you at all plugged in?’) that is not conversation–
initial, a use that has also become conventionalized, as indicated by the fact that
‘Hi’ lacks this use.
5A similar datum from Estonian is pointed out to us by an anonymous reviewer for
Frontiers: with the phrase ‘jo¯udu tarvis’ ([sufficient] strength [will be] necessary)
requiring as preceding utterance the phrase jo¯udu’ (‘’[may you the necessary]
strength’). This latter is typically uttered on passing anyone working on the
street/in their garden etc.
form–oriented cross-turn presuppositions apply to multi word
expressions as well:6
(6) (#) A: ya’atik el’afiye B: Allah ya’afik .
(#) A: give-3rd-sg-fut def-health B: God healthify-
3rd-sg-fut
‘ A: [God] give you health B: God healthify-you’.
3.1.3. Non-sentential Utterances
Greetings and partings are just two examples of non-sentential
utterances: utterances lacking an overt predicate [see examples
(1)–(3) above and elsewhere]. Such utterances are ubiquitous in
conversations: de Weijer (2001) provides figures of 40, 31, and
30% respectively for the percentage of oneword utterances in the
speech exchanged between adults and infant, adult and toddler,
and among adults in a single Dutch speaking family consisting of
2 adults, 1 toddler and 1 baby across 2 months.
Non-sentential utterances are not a motley crowd; recent
studies have shown that they can be reliably classified into a
small number of categories, revolving around the commonality
in semantic resolution process (see e.g., Fernández and Ginzburg,
2002; Schlangen, 2003). And yet, clearly a non-sentential
utterance has little content outside a conversational context. (7)
illustrates that this same form can receive highly diverse contents
from a wide range of sources: a previously uttered question, a
question implicit in a particular domain, and as a correction:
(7) a. B: Four croissants.
b. (Context: A: What did you buy in the bakery?) Content:
I bought four croissants in the bakery.
c. (Context: A smiles at B, who has become the next
customer to be served at the bakery.) Content: I would
like to buy four croissants.
d. (Context: A: Dad bought four crescents.) Content: You
mean that Dad bought four croissants.
Thus, the competence in producing and understanding such
utterances involves the context in an unavoidable way, including,
as exemplified in (7b), how utterances fit in with social
interaction. Conversely, matters of form can themselves, in the
general case, require reference to the context. It was already
pointed out by Lakoff (1971) and Morgan (1973)—though
subsequently largely forgotten–that non-sentential utterances
provide evidence that grammaticality cannot be adjudged context
independently, i.e., simply by considering the morphosyntactic
properties of a string. (8a,b) involve two virtually synonymous
questions that lead to distinct contexts. (8a) is compatible with a
possessive NP as response, but not with a nominative NP, whereas
in (8b) this pattern is reversed.
(8) a. A: Whose book did you borrow? B: Jo’s. /# Jo
b. A: Who owns the book you borrowed? B: # Jo’s. / Jo. /
It’s Jo’s.
6For additional data about such cross-turn presuppositions see Linell (2009) and
Linell and Mertzlufft (2014) on the Swedish and German x-och/und-x and initial
double auxiliary constructions.
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Viewed from the perspective of the non-sentential utterance,
this pattern suggests that the non-sentential utterance ‘Jo’s’ has
a presupposition that, to the extent its antecedent derives from
a linguistic utterance, it must bear genitive case. Cross–turn
dependencies of this kind are common among various types of
non-sentential utterances, across a wide range of languages (Ross,
1969; Merchant, 2001; Sag and Nykiel, 2011; Ginzburg, 2012).
What bears emphasizing is that such dependencies can stretch
across many turns, particularly in multi-party dialogue, thereby
reinforcing the need for this information to be in long-medium
term representation of context: Ginzburg and Fernández (2005)
found that in the British National Corpus (BNC) over 44% of
short answers have more than distance 1, and over 24% have
distance 4 or more, as in the constructed example in (9):
(9) a. A(1): Who is coming to the barbecue?
B(2): the barbecue on Sunday?
A(3): the 29th yes
B(4): Sunday is the 28th.
A(5): Oh right, yes the 28th.
B(6): The one Sam’s organizing?
A(7): Yes.
B(8): Will it be on even if it snows?
A(9): Sam hasn’t said anything.
B(10): Right. Anyway, I’d guess Sue and Pat for sure,
maybe Alex too.
3.2. References to the Interaction Situation
In this section we discuss a number of constructions, many of
which utterly ubiquitous, that make reference to the ongoing
interaction situation.
3.2.1. References to Events in the Interaction
Situation
Deictic reference to objects simultaneous with pointing, of the
type already discussed, is not the only form of reference to
aspects of the interaction situation. There are a number of other
expressions, particularly in spoken written language use, whose
referent can only be described by in terms of events in the
interaction situation.
Most current theories of discourse structure–e.g., SDRT
(Asher and Lascarides, 2003)—assume that connectives involve
some sort of implicit reference to illocutionary events. And
indeed explicit references to illocutionary acts are also possible, as
in the following example, where demonstrative that in the second
utterance is a reference to the promise.
(10) a. A: John, I promise I will help you with your homework.
b. B: That was silly, as you won’t have any time.
But locutionary events can be referred to as well. Webber
(1991), for instance, discusses examples like (11), in which
demonstrative that and pronoun it refer to the locutionary act
performed with the first utterance.
(11) a. A: The combination is 1-2-3-4.
b. B: Could you repeat that? I didn’t hear it.
3.2.2. Clarification Requests
Plato was already at least implicitly aware of the fact that language
enables one to explicitly address communicative aspects of an
utterance: the Socratic dialogues are replete with examples of
utterances whose primary function is to serve as clarification
requests (CRs), in other words to indicate that some aspect of
a prior utterance, typically its meaning, is unclear:
(12) a. Her. Yes; but what do you say of the other name?
Soc. Athene?
Her. Yes.
b. Soc. There is no difficulty in explaining the other
appellation of Athene.
Her. What other appellation?
Soc. We call her Pallas. (From Cratylus, http://en.
wikisource.org/wiki/Cratylus).
CRs can take many forms, as illustrated in Table 1, a taxonomy
based on CRs occurring in the British National Corpus.
Providing explicit formal analyses of just about any of
these classes is a formidable challenge for most existing formal
grammatical frameworks. We highlight just a few of the most
significant issues.
The first point to note is that for a number of these forms the
sole analysis is as clarification requests: this applies to the classes
Wh-substituted Reprise and Gap. The meanings of such forms
cannot be analyzed in interaction–free grammar.
A second point relates to cross-turn parallelism. Ginzburg
and Cooper (2004) and Ginzburg (2012) argue in detail
that reprise fragments have two main classes of uses, one
to request confirmation about the content of a previous
sub-utterance, the other to find out about the intended
content of a previous sub-utterance. Both uses have strong
parallelism requirements. The former requires identity
of morphosyntactic category between source and target,
as illustrated in (13a,b). The latter requires segmental
identity between source and target, as exemplified in (13c).
Parallelism of the latter kind seems needed also for the Gap class
of CRs:
TABLE 1 | A taxonomy for clarification requests, Table 1 from Purver
(2006).
Category name Example
Example context A: Did Bo leave?
Wot B: Eh? / What? / Pardon?
Explicit B: Did you say ‘Bo’ /
What do you mean ‘leave’?
Literal reprise B: Did BO leave?
Did Bo LEAVE?
Wh-substituted Reprise B: Did WHO leave?
Did Bo WHAT?
Reprise sluice B: Who? / What? / Where?
Reprise Fragments B: Bo? / Leave?
Gap B: Did Bo …?
Filler A: Did Bo …B: Win?
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(13) a. A: Did she hit him? B: #he/ him
b. A: Was she biking? B: biking/cycling/#biked?
c. A: Did Bo leave? B: Bo? (Intended content reading:
Who are you referring to? or Who do you mean?)
Alternative reprise: B: Max? lacks intended content
reading; can only mean: Are you referring to Max?).
A final point concerning CRs involves anaphora: CRs typically
involve anaphoric reference to utterance tokens. This is, in fact, a
more general requirement concerning quotative acts in dialogue,
to which we return below.
(14) a. A: Max is leaving. B: leaving? (=What does ‘leaving’
mean in the A’s sub-utterance, NOT in general.)
b. A: We’re fed up. B: Who is we? (=Who is we in the
sub-utterance needing clarification).
3.2.3. Order-Dependent Expressions
So-called ‘Metalinguistic’ expressions are expressions whose
interpretation depends on the way other utterances have been
pronounced, or on the order in which other expressions
have been uttered. We will concentrate here on metalinguistic
expressions whose interpretation is affected by the order in
which other expressions are uttered or occur in a text, such as
the former/the latter, vice versa, respectively, and the following
(McCawley, 1970; Kay, 1989; Corblin, 1999; Yamauchi, 2006).
The uses of these expressions we are interested in are illustrated
in (15a) and (15b):
(15) a. Bob and John were at the meeting. The former brought
his wife with him. (Quirk/Greenbaum)
b. I think actors can teach dancers a lot, and vice versa.
(From the British National Corpus.)
Former in (15a) has a different meaning from the meaning it has
in expressions like George Bush, the former president of the US.
Intuitively, the semantics of the definite description the former
in examples like (15a) can be specified informally as follows:
the definite description denotes that element of a familiar set of
individuals that is denoted by the first NP used to introduce an
element of that set. In other words, these definite descriptions
behave like the definite description the yellow one in Bill Singer
bought two shirts. The yellow one had red buttons, except that
the identifying property is metalinguistic: it refers to the order
of elements in the text.
Regarding vice versa, it seems reasonable to assume that the
use of vice versa exemplified by (15b) denotes the proposition
which is the content of the statement obtained by exchanging
two elements of a previous statement; i.e., that vice versa in
(15b) denotes the proposition that is the content of the statement
dancers can teach actors a lot obtained by reverting the order
of two sub-utterances of (15b), the utterance of dancers and the
utterance of actors (Culicover and Jackendoff, 2012).
How can wemake this informal semantics of order-dependent
expressions more precise? One might think that the semantics of
the former, at least, could be specified within a framework like
Heim’s File Change Semantics (Heim, 1982), by assuming that
an ordering exists on the set of file cards posited to underlie
reference resolution in the theory. More specifically, one could
propose that the sense of former under discussion is a predicate
that is satisfied by the element of a set iff the file card associated
with that element precedes the file cards associated with the other
elements of the set. And indeed, a proposal of this type was made
in Corblin and Laborde (2001). Corblin and Laborde propose
that the common ground consists of two parts: a part containing
information about the propositional content of utterances, and
a part so-called mentionelle containing information about the
mentions of file cards. Two observations can be made about
this approach. First, that the information mentionelle is in effect
information about a subset of the utterances in the Interaction
Situation–namely, the utterances of NPs. Second, that in order
to account for the entire range of order-dependent expressions,
more is needed. This is because vice versa, in particular, can refer
to the order of virtually any sentence constituents, not just noun
phrases. In the famous Dorothy Parker joke I’m too fucking busy,
and vice versa, for example, the constituents that get ‘switched’
are an adjective and an intensifier, and the switching affects their
syntactic interpretation as well as their meaning. This suggests
that in the general case a more general form of metalinguistic
reference can be used, involving references to various types
of utterances of syntactic constituents in the Interaction
Situation.
3.2.4. Turn Taking
As first pointed out in the seminal paper by Sacks et al. (1974),
interlocutors manage turn allocation remarkably well. This has
often been summarized as no-gap-no-overlap, though Heldner
and Edlund (2010), based on a study of corpora in Dutch,
Swedish, and English, conclude that sizable departures from
no-gap-no-overlap occur frequently, while cases with neither
gap nor overlap are very rare: gaps with a duration above the
threshold for detection of silences represent more than 40% of
all between-speaker intervals in their material, whereas overlaps
represent about 40% of all between-speaker intervals. Levinson
and Torreira (2015) dispute certain of the conclusions of Heldner
and Edlund (2010), specifically the doubts the latter cast on the
Sacks et al model, and emphasize the challenges turn taking poses
for existing psycholinguistic models of language processing. How
turn taking is achieved clearly involves a complex interaction
of cues, initially morphosyntactic ones, these later interacting
with intonational ones (Levinson and Torreira, 2015) and is also
strongly conditioned by content—it is, for instance, infelicitous
to respond gaplessly to a complex question (Heldner and Edlund,
2010). However, regardless of the precise division of labor, it is
clear that some aspects of turn taking are grammaticized. Thus,
the collocation ‘go ahead’ is used to cede the turn, typically
when there has been overlap, as exemplified in (16a). (McCarthy
and O’Keeffe, 2003) show that turn management is one of the
important uses of vocatives particularly in multi-party dialogue,
as illustrated in (16b,c). In such cases the fact that the turn has
been assigned to the person addressed is, arguably, part of its
conventional meaning.
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(16) a. A:yeah that’s that’s kind of strange [laughter] that we got
the same call B:[laughter];yeah uh uhA:it to whi[ch]- oh
B: oh i’m sorry go ahead A: no that’s okay (Switchboard
corpus Godfrey et al. (1992), 2053:62)
b. A: I should have some change. B: I owe you too don’t I,
Jodie. C: Yes you do. (Example (14) fromMcCarthy and
O’Keeffe (2003))
c. [A caller (C), a nurse, is talking about the special
vocation of nurses and doctors. Monica Hall (B), a nurse
wrongly accused of murdering a colleague in Saudi
Arabia, is already on the line] C: . . . I’m sure Monica
would agree with me on this its a sort of kind of spiritual
relationship. You’re all fighting for the one thing and
that one thing is to preserve and improve life for people.
A: Monica? B: Yes I I would agree there M=Mari is it?
(Example (28) from McCarthy and O’Keeffe (2003)).
Representing turnmanagement in a collocation such as ‘go ahead’
or in a turn assigning use of a vocative requires means of stating
within the grammar information such as ‘referent of this NP is
hereby offered the next turn.’
3.3. Online Self-Repair/Own
Communication Management
As we saw in examples (1)–(3), conversations are littered
with disfluencies, or as we would prefer to describe it,
conversationalists continually utilize own communication
management (OCM) devices to correct or modify their
utterances or to gain extra time when facing lexical access or
utterance planning problems7. Although own communication
management is viewed as a performance phenomenon in most
formal grammatical treatments—a view explicitly rejected by
psycholinguists e.g., Levelt (1983), Clark and FoxTree (2002),
Ferreira (2005), the unity it displays with Other Communication
Management (clarification questions and other–corrections) was
noted already in the seminal paper (Schegloff et al., 1977).
Probably the main substantive reason for pushing OCMs
to the performance wastebasket is the assumption that they
constitute noise. But in fact, far from constituting meaningless
noise, OCMs participate in semantic and pragmatic processes
such as anaphora, conversational implicature, and discourse
particles, as illustrated in (17–19). In (17), the semantic process
is dependent on the reparandum (the phrase to be repaired) as
the antecedent:
(17) a. Peter was, well, he was fired. (Example from Heeman
and Allen (1999); anaphor refers to material in
reparandum)
b. A: Because I, any, anyone, any friend, anyone, I give my
number to is welcome to call me (Example from the
Switchboard corpus (Godfrey et al., 1992); implicature
based on contrast between repair and reprandum: ‘It’s
not just her friends that are welcome to call her when A
gives them her number’).
7The term ‘own communication management’ is due to Jens Allwood, see
e.g., Allwood et al. (2005) for discussion.
Moreover, utterances containing disfluencies constitute a
subclass of the antecedents for various linguistic expressions,
including ‘no’ and ‘or’:
(18) a. From yellow down to brown - no - that’s red. (From
Levelt (1983))
b. Over the gree-, no I’m wrong, left of the green disk...
c. A: Is Bill coming? B: No, Mary is.
d. [A opens the freezer to discover a smashed beer bottle]
A: No! (‘I do not want this (the beer bottle smashing) to
happen’).
(19) a. We go straight on, or– we enter via red, then go straight
on to green. (From Levelt (1983))
b. The design of or– the point of putting two sensors on
each side. (From Besser and Alexandersson (2007)).
Non-disfluent speech is analogous to frictionless motion. Some
of the time it is useful to ignore the effects of friction, but
the theory of motion is required to explicate the existence
and quantitative effects of friction. Whereas it seems plausible
that not all disfluencies are consciously produced by the
speaker, for the addressee they always form part of the
verbal string as perceived which needs to be parsed and
interpreted.
Moreover, OCMs illustrate the primacy—or at least equal
footing—of the speech event over grammatical form:8 as
Levelt (1983) has observed, speakers will stop in ‘mid
word’ when detecting error, as exemplified in (20a,b)—in
the latter apparently the speaker replaces the beginning of
the verb ‘instruct’ with the less specific verb ‘do’; moreover,
speakers can stop in mid-utterance if the intended meaning
seems to have been communicated—in (20c) D produces a
clause headed by the complementizer ‘whether’, omitting a
subordinating predicate (e.g., ‘is unclear/unlikely’ etc) and both
he and A laugh together about the mutually communicated
content:
(20) a. We can go straight on to the ye–, to the orange node.
Levelt (1983)
b. Bee: y’know they(d) they do b- t!.hhhh they try even
harder than a- y’know a regular instructor. /Ava: Right. /
Bee: hhhh to uh insr yknow do the class and everything.
(example (18) from Fox et al. (2010))
c. D: lots of secretaries do that, but it’s such a waste of
time, but on the other hand you do meet / A : yes / D:
secretaries. Whether you want to meet secretaries . . .
A,D: (laugh) (From the London Lund corpus, Svartvik
and Quirk (1980)).
8See also data from http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/003011.
html and from Yuan et al. (2006), showing the regularity of the extent of speech
events.
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Indeed, OCM utterances display an important characteristic
of grammatical processes, namely cross-linguistic variation. This
has been documented in some detail in comparative work
between morphosyntactic aspects of repair on a wide range of
languages by Fox et al. (e.g., Fox et al., 1996; Wouk et al.,
2009; Fox et al., 2010). For phonetic analysis of cross-linguistic
variation see Candea et al. (2005), who compare fillers in
Arabic, Mandarin Chinese, French, German, Italian, European
Portuguese, American English and Latin American Spanish.
They demonstrate that language-specific features can be observed
in the segmental structure of the fillers. French, for example,
prefers a vocalic segment as filler realization, whereas English
prefers vowels followed occasionally by a nasal coda consonant
[m]. Moreover, while for some languages the vocalic support of
the fillers might be a segment exterior to the vocalic system of
the language, in all the eight languages the fillers’ vocalic support
involves at least one of the vowels of their vocalic system.
There is some variation in how hesitation is typically
expressed in various languages, as exemplified in (21). Indeed,
some languages, e.g., Chinese and Finnish exemplified in (21c,d),
use demonstratives for this role:
(21) a. ‘uh’ ‘um’ (English) (Clark and FoxTree, 2002)
b. ‘euh’ ... (French): tu sais c’était un peu euh l’ambiance
santa-Barbar- euh (De Fornel and Marandin (1996),
example (1a))
c. Chinese: ‘en’, ‘nage . . . ’ repeated ad libitum (literally
‘that . . . ’), ‘zhege’ (literally ‘this’) (Zhao and Jurafsky,
2005)
d. Finnish: ‘tuota noin’ (’that so’), , or ’tuota . . . ’ repeated
ad libitum (’that . . . ’)9.
Clark and FoxTree (2002), following an earlier proposal by
James (1972) and based on data from the London Lund corpus,
claim that the choice of ‘um’ vs. ‘uh’ reflects an explicit choice
by the speaker—the former selected when the speaker faces
a relatively significant difficulty which will lead to a longer
wait for the resumption of the utterance; for dissent against
this claim see e.g., O’Connell and Kowal (2005) and Corley
and Stewart (2008) Recently, Tian et al. (2016) demonstrate
significant preference for ‘um’ v. ‘uh’ among speakers of British
English before self addressed questions (e.g., ‘What do they call
it?’ ‘what’s her name?’)—a clear signal of major difficulty, but no
significant difference among speakers of American English (data
from Switchboard); they also demonstrate marked preference
for certain hesitation markers in Japanese and Chinese on
the basis of distinct syntactic contexts. Wieling et al. (2016)
demonstrate significant differences in the choice of ‘um’ vs. ‘uh’
(and their cross-linguistic variants) both between male/female
and younger/older speakers in four Germanic languages (Dutch,
English, German, and Norwegian). This emergent body of work
supports the claim that hesitation markers are words the choice
between which reflects explicit speaker intention.
9We owe this datum to an anonymous reviewer for Frontiers.
Additional reasoning supporting the need for incorporating
disfluency markers in the grammar are the following
considerations: a child acquiring English needs to discover
that ‘no’ can be used in a self-correction, but, for instance, the
closely related word ‘nope’ cannot. A trilingual acquiring English,
German, and French will need to learn that French ‘enfin’ can be
used in a self-correction, whereas English ‘finally’ and German
‘schließlich,’ which are often interchangeable with ‘enfin,’ cannot
be so used:
(22) Quand ma belle mère’ enfin quand ma femme apelle
When my in-law mother enfin when my wife calls
‘When my mother in–law I mean when my wife calls’
(De Fornel and Marandin, 1996, example (2a)).
Conversely, Ginzburg et al. (2014) suggest that OCMs are also
involved in grammatical universals. Based on evidence from 7
languages, they postulate the following:
(23) If NEG is a language’s word that can be used as a
negation and in cross-turn correction, then NEG can
also be used as an editing phrase in backward-looking
disfluencies.
3.4. Why There Cannot be a Global
Grammar: Evidence from Quotation
The phenomenon of direct quotation perhaps epitomizes the
point of the paper: it is ubiquitous, it is subject to grammatical
constraints, but features in few formal grammars (for some
recent formal treatments see Geurts andMaier, 2005; Potts, 2007;
Bonami and Godard, 2008, but these do not form part of a large
scale grammar). In a way this is not surprising since, as argued
by Ginzburg and Cooper (2014), quotation is a challenge for any
grammar G: for any string e deemed ungrammatical by G, one
can produce via quotation a well formed string that includes e,
hence undermining G. Thus, we can quote something that is
ungrammatical in our own language as in (24a) or something that
is in a different language to the one we are speaking (24b), sounds
made by inanimate objects (24c), or the thoughts of non-humans
(24d).
(24) a. Damien, who’s only four years old, said ‘I go’ed to
Grandma’s’
b. Pelle, whose native language is Swedish, said ‘Jag har
varit hos mormor’ (meaning “I’ve been at Grandma’s”)
c. The blender went ‘plplplpl’
d. [An article about an orphaned walrus arriving in a
new zoo:] During [the orphan walrus’s] first look at a
walrus, he was like, ‘What’s that?’ (New York Times,
22/01/2014).
Given the diversity of quotable stuff, one might very well think
it beyond the remit of somebody writing a formal grammar
of English to characterize everything that can occur between
quotation marks in sentences like those in (24). Such a strategy
is, however, not tenable, for reasons mostly pointed out already
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by Partee (1973), who provides a variety of examples where the
form or the content of the quotation is referred to from outside
the quotation as in (25).
(25) a. ‘I talk better English than the both of youse!’ shouted
Charles, thereby convincing me that he didn’t.
b. The sign says ‘GeorgeWashington slept here’, but I don’t
believe he really did.
c. What he actually said was, ‘It’s clear that you’ve given
this problem a great deal of thought,’ but he meant quite
the opposite.
And indeed there is substantial evidence that quotation is subject
to general grammatical principles governing word order, ability
to be embedded and pseudo-clefted, and semantic selection
(Postal, 2004; Bonami and Godard, 2008). For instance, there
are words in numerous languages that require direct quotation
as their complements. In English the marker like and the verb
go have a certain usage which requires a direct quotation as in
(26a) and (26b) and does not allow an indirect quotation, as
exemplified in (26c) and (26d).
(26) I asked her if she wanted to read my paper
a. and she was like “Are you crazy?”
b. and she went “Yuck!”
c. * and she was like whether I was crazy
d. * and she went that she didn’t, in no uncertain terms
(examples from Ginzburg and Cooper (2014)).
Such constructions exist in many, if not all, languages although
they tend to be restricted to an informal spoken register, see
e.g., French faire, genre, German quasi, Italian tipo, and Swedish
typ/ba. Moreover, all natural languages seem to have direct
quotation of some kind. Children use direct quotation from
their earliest utterances (Ginzburg and Moradlou, 2013). Given
the ubiquity of quotation in natural language, linguists need to
explicate the mechanisms it employs. Indeed, one is obligated to
do so in a way that offers an answer to the question: why, rather
than being a heterodox linguistic process, is in fact quotation
so straightforward? We will suggest one such answer below.
Whatever one proposes, it seems clear that direct quotation
is a grammatical construction where reference is made to an
interaction act, constrained via a similarity relation that needs to
hold between the quoted material and the original act; Ginzburg
and Cooper (2014) argue that the nature of the similarity
relation is a contextual parameter of this construction, as is local
grammar—the system of rules used to classify the original act.
Most crucially, it forces the grammar to be an intrinsically open
system (Harris, 1979; Postal, 2004).
3.5. Pointing, Gestures and the Interaction
Situation
The view of the role of pointing and other gestures in
communication, as discussed in Section 2, that essentially
abstracts away from the Interaction Situation, has been
challenged in a number of ways.
3.5.1. Pointing
Extensive empirical work by Lücking, Pfeiffer, Rieser and
colleagues at the University of Bielefeld (Kranstedt et al., 2006;
Lücking et al., 2015) using highly sophisticated recording and
visualization equipment has demonstrated that pointing gestures
seldom if ever function as unique identifiers of a demonstratum,
as proposed by Kaplan (1978). In all but the simplest situations,
the identification of the demonstratum among the objects in
the pointing cone identified by a pointing gesture is a complex
reasoning process involving consideration of a number of
additional aspects of the Interaction Situation.
Beyond this, Clark (2003) showed that pointing is neither the
only nor the prototypical way to carry out a demonstration. For
instance, a customer can felicitously demonstrate to the teller in
a supermarker the referents of a demonstrative like These two
things over here by placing the two objects on the counter rather
than merely pointing at them.
3.5.2. Interactional Role of Other Gestures
Kendon (2004) distinguishes between two types of gestures:
gestures that contribute to what he calls the ‘referential meaning’
of the utterance (discussed in Chapters 9–11) and ‘pragmatic’
gestures (discussed in Chapters 12 and 13). Among the latter,
there are several whose function is to manage aspects of the
Interaction Situation. These include gestures whose function is
to indicate to whom a current utterance is addressed, and several
gestures that play a role in turn-taking: for instance, indicating
that the speaker is holding the floor, or raising a hand to request
a turn, or pointing to indicate the next to hold the floor.
(27a) exemplifies a wordless exchange mediated solely by
display and gesture, which corresponds to a question/answer pair,
as in either (27b), where the question is implicit and the answer is
a non-sentential utterance, or (27c), where the question is explicit
and the answer is a non-sentential utterance. This indicates the
need for a mechanism that unifies all three cases, given the
intuitive synonymy.
(27) a. Owner: (displays three fresh fish on a platter) Clark:
(points at one of them) (From Clark (2012): example
(32))
b. Owner: (displays three fresh fish on a platter) Clark:
(points at one of them) That one.
c. Owner: Which fish do you want for dinner? Clark:
(points at one of them) That one.
Note that whereas meaningful utterances of just about any
modality can be clarified using a construction such as ‘what
do you mean ‘. . . ” (28a,b), clarification via repetition is limited
to speech (28c,d). The first fact indicates that such utterances
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are viewed as having a content on a par with linguistic speech;
the second fact demonstrates that clarification via repetition is
not ‘anything goes’ and involves a construction that has clearly
defined selectional restrictions (in contrast with certain other
quotative constructions discussed in section 3.4):10
(28) a. A : (laughs). B: What do youmean he he? /Why are you
laughing?
b. P1: my spine’s like (gestures spine shape) (1.0 sec) like
that (0.9 sec)
P2: like this? (gestures to clarify spine shape, quizzical
face) (From the corpus described in Healey et al. (2015))
c. A : (laughs). B: (laughs) [cannot mean ‘what’s the
meaning of your laughter?]
d. A: (makes strange gesture) B: (repeats A’s gesture)
[cannot mean ‘what’s the meaning of this gesture you
just made?].
Finally, we note two interactions between phenomena described
earlier: first, the possibility of quoting gesture, as in (29):
(29) Claire: How pleasant, mum’s being sick everywhere.
I said erm is there a problem? (laugh) (vomiting noise)
No. Not a problem. (BNC,KPH).
Second, the finding of Cook et al. (2009) that when speakers
produce structures that they themselves usually disprefer, they are
more likely to produce OCM utterances and to produce gestures.
4. EVIDENCE FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES
4.1. Language Acquisition
Language acquisition has often been presented as the raison
d’être of (formal) grammar. Since the mid 1960s Universal
Grammar was proposed as a means of characterizing the
knowledge children have as they acquire language and of course
the ‘end state’ when the language is acquired (Chomsky, 1965;
Snyder, 2007)11. In this paper we argue for a richer notion
of grammar, but paradoxically this enriched notion is, we
believe, a more promising theoretical notion as far as language
acquisition/development is concerned than its interaction–free
counterpart.
To what extent is interaction a necessary feature of language
acquisition?12 In the extreme cases it is known that wolf
children and children held in isolation do not acquire language
in any normal sense (Lane, 1979; Curtiss, 2014). A far more
10With respect to (28d), it’s unclear whether repetition of a gesture accompanied
by a quizzical face conveys a clarification request; Catherine Pelachaud (p.c.) has
suggested to us that it might; this is currently the subject of an experimental study.
However, at least in corpora where gesture clarification has been studied, one
apparently finds only examples like (28b), as in the corpus described in Healey
et al. (2015), data we thank Nicola Plant (p.c.) for.
11We use scare quotes for ‘end state’ because changes in adult grammar as a result
of repair phenomena we have detailed above are a key feature of the notion of
grammar we advocate.
12For a much more detailed discussion than we can offer here, on which we draw
extensively, see Hoff (2006).
difficult set of issues revolve around the fact that in a variety
of cultures—e.g., Warlpiri and Mayan (Bavin, 1992; Brown,
2001)—infants are not considered potential or appropriate
conversational partners, and so infants are not directly addressed
by adults. And yet, language is acquired. Lieven (1994) argues
that in such cultures language acquisition involves a significantly
distinct trajectory. Nonetheless, despite anecdotal evidence
suggesting slower development in such societies, there are
various difficulties to compare rates of comprehension between
the two types of developmental environments given different
access to conversation for children. On the other hand, there
is extensive evidence about differences in amount and type
of utterances children are exposed to across distinct social
socioeconomic status (SES). Most famously, Hart and Risley
(1995) reported a ratio of approximately 4 : 2 : 1 for the total
words heard by, respectively, American children of high SES
parents middle SES parents, and lower SES parents. This is
strongly correlated with speed of acquisition: by 3 years of age,
the mean cumulative recorded vocabulary for the higher SES
children was over 1000 words and for the lower SES children
it was somewhat less than 500, whereas other studies show
similar large effects on grammatical development (e.g., Snow,
1999).
To this one can add important experimental and corpus-based
work on the efficacy and ubiquity of error correcting interaction
between parents and children. In a series of papers using a
paradigm of teaching nonsense verbs to young children, Saxton
et al. (Saxton et al., 1998; Saxton, 2000) show that (i) learning
on the basis of positive and negative evidence was significantly
faster than learning solely on the basis of positive evidence; (ii)
negative evidence has a long-term impact on the grammaticality
of child speech. On a larger scale, Chouinard and Clark (2003)
show, based on a detailed longitudinal study of 5 English and
French speaking children, that negative evidence is supplied to
a high percentage of children’s erroneous utterances at all levels
(phonological through syntactic).
An interaction–free view of grammar has to remain silent
about such findings; approaches which view grammar as
characterizing talk in interaction can correlate the quality of
the interaction with speed and quality of intermediate states.
Indeed, the repair notions we suggest belong in the grammar
can, at least in principle, offer a basis for how interaction enables
grammar modification to take place. We hasten to add that these
findings have not yet been tied into formal models of learning
(see e.g., Clark and Lappin, 2010). But this reflects the current
state of the art in this field. Broadly speaking, there are currently
two main approaches to the acquisition of grammar. There
is nativism, inspired by Chomskyan assumptions (Chomsky,
1965; Snyder, 2007) and there is the usage–based approach
(Tomasello, 2003). These two approaches differ radically on
a number of dimensions: the nativist approach assumes the
autonomy of syntax, whereas the usage–based approach takes
constructions, conventionalized form-function units, as basic;
for nativism the role of learning is limited to words and
how these relate to Universal Grammar, whereas the usage-
based approach highlights the importance of domain-general
learning mechanisms such as analogy, entrenchment, and
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automatization. As things stand, however, neither nativist, nor
the usage-based approach has advanced an explicit theory that
would enable one to make clear predictions about how the
grammatical system of a child evolves at various points as
a result of conversational interaction with her carers or as
an observer of such conversations. This is, in part, because,
with very few exceptions (Ginzburg and Moradlou, 2013;
Jackendoff and Wittenberg, 2014), the early stages of linguistic
competence have not been formally described, presumably
because of the significant challenge they pose for existing
grammar frameworks.
4.2. Cognitive Neuroscience
Earlier claims regarding e.g., the role of Broca’s area in the
processing of transformations notwithstanding (see e.g.,
Bambini, 2012 for a general survey of the neuroscience of
language, and Grodzinsky, 2003 for an hypothesis about
transformations in the brain), there is still a substantial
disconnect between the research programs of cognitive
neuroscience and theoretical linguistics, and the hypotheses
that get formulated in those camps (Poeppel and Embick,
2005; Grimaldi, 2012). The primary interest of neurolinguists,
cognitive neuroscientists studying language, is to identify the
areas involved in different aspects of language processing; and
there is now converging evidence that several areas are involved,
above all the frontal lobe (e.g., Brodmann areas 44–Broca’s area–
45, 46, and 47), the temporal lobe (e.g., the superior temporal
lobe, STL—Wernicke’s area—and the superior temporal gyrus,
STG), and parietal lobe (e.g., the angular gyrus; Bambini, 2012;
Grimaldi, 2012). Such evidence clearly does not support either
the claim of a separate ’faculty of language,’ or the existence of
a division between competence and performance (Grimaldi,
2012).
Some of the aspects of language use that we are proposing
are governed by grammar, in particular turn-taking, have been
studied in the field of neuropragmatics (Van Berkum, 2010;
Bambini, 2012) but such studies show that the areas involved
in such processing are the same, or very closely related, to those
involved in aspects of language interpretation more traditionally
accepted as involving competence. In fact, such studies tend
to show that involvement in those aspects of language use
results in greater activation of some of the areas associated with
language processing. For instance, Jiang et al. (2012) found, using
functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS), that face-to-face
dialogue results in increased activation in the inferior frontal
cortex13 in comparison with back-to-back communication, or
back-to-back monolog. And the comparison with face-to-face
monolog strongly suggests that the difference in activation is
primarily based on turn taking and body language.
Evidence concerning the timing of these interpretive processes
doesn’t clearly support their isolation from conventional aspects
of grammatical interpretation either. Evidence by, e.g., Egorova
et al. (2014) suggests that speech act identification and
interpretation takes place rapidly—in fact, more rapidly than
certain types of lexical-semantic processing.
13Specifically, they seem to refer to Broca’s area–see Jiang et al. (2012), Figure 1.
5. GRAMMAR FOR INTERACTION :
PRINCIPLES AND ILLUSTRATION
One of the reasons for the relative neglect by linguists of
phenomena such as those discussed in Section 3 is the apparent
lack of adequate formal tools to describe their grammar. One
of the key contentions of this paper, however, is that this is
no longer the case, and that several frameworks for describing
conversational contexts now exist which provide the tools
to characterize the grammar of such phenomena. We then
informally discuss how grammatical frameworks satisfying these
constraints have been used to provide an account for the variety
of phenomena discussed in Section 3. Our discussion will be
sketchy and fairly informal, but in virtually all cases detailed,
formally worked out treatments already exist to which references
are provided.
5.1. Key Theoretical Assumptions
The interactionist view of grammar involves at least the following
assumptions.
1. Interaction situation reference Grammars make essential
reference to a dynamically updated interaction situation
which indicates what is happening as the interaction takes
place, along with some record of what has happened already.
2. Sign instantiation The grammar makes essential reference
to certain audio-visual-gestural events that occur in the
interaction event: uttering sounds, pointing, gesturing, etc.
(a) Incremental classification: such events are classified into
grammar-relevant types (signs) in incremental fashion by
conversational participants.
(b) Partiality: The classification process can be partial, where
the type does not uniquely classify the event, thereby
triggering repair.
(c) Non-monotonicity: The classification process can be non-
monotonic: the type assigned to an event can change as a
consequence of repair.
3. Event types in grammar rules Linguistic generalizations and
procedures are expressed not solely in terms of the events
themselves but also in terms of types of events (or situations).
4. Event type inference Event types are used in rules
which specify the enrichment of the interaction event by
propositional and erotetic inference14.
5. Language in flux The class of grammatical types can be
modified during interaction15.
Interaction situation reference is relatively uncontroversial:
any grammar that treats indexicals like ‘I,’ ‘you,’ and ‘now’
needs to somehow effect reference to the interaction
situation. However, the orthodox treatment (following
Kaplan, 1978) is for this reference to be viewed as external
14That is, inference whose conclusion is, respectively, a proposition or a question—
we exemplify both kinds of inference below.
15We borrow this term, originally due to Ruth Kempson, from Cooper and Ranta
(2008) and Cooper (2012), who argue for a view of natural language grammar as
a collection of resources that a linguistic agent has available in order to build local
languages on the fly.
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to the grammar, formulated as indices relativizing the
evaluation of sentences; the extent of indexicality assumed
here and its explicitness yields significant novelty. By contrast,
language in flux is operative in no major approach. It is
however a key assumption for both language acquisition and
repair.
The key innovations here are the assumptions we called
Event types in grammar rules, Event type inference, and Sign
instantiation. The latter has several components, which are
pairwise independent (so a grammatical framework might satisfy
one without satisfying one of the others). As we will see, these
assumptions have several controversial consequences for a more
traditional view of grammar.
For concreteness we will assume a particular specification of
the interaction situation that developed in the dialogue semantic
framework KOS (Ginzburg, 2012), though there are a variety of
alternative theories of this notion, from the original formulation
in Barwise and Perry (1983) to PTT (Poesio and Rieser, 2010,
2011)16. It is important to emphasize that on the approach
developed in both KoS and PTT, there is actually no single
context or interaction situation. Rather, analysis is formulated at
a level of information states, one per conversational participant.
Each information state consists of two parts, a private part and
the dialogue gameboard, inspired by Lewis (1979), that represents
information that arises from public interactions. The structure of
the dialogue gameboard (DGB) is given in Table 2. The Spkr and
Addr fields allow one to track turn ownership; Facts represents
conversationally shared assumptions; VisualSit represents the
dialogue participant’s view of the visual situation and attended
entities; Pending represents moves that are in the process of
being grounded and Moves represents moves that have been
grounded; QUD tracks the questions currently under discussion,
though not simply questions qua semantic objects, but pairs of
entities which we call InfoStrucs: a question and an antecedent
sub-utterance17. This latter entity provides a partial specification
of the focal (sub)utterance, and hence it is dubbed the focus
establishing constituent (FEC)18 (cf. parallel element in higher
order unification–based approaches to ellipsis resolution e.g.,
Gardent and Kohlhase (1997) and Vallduví (2016) relates the
focus establishing constituent with a notion needed to capture
contrast.
5.2. Sign Instantiation and Its
Consequences
One of the types of events that are recorded in the Interaction
Situation according to the sign instantiation hypothesis are
utterances. Specifically, we assume that as the result of utterances
16Neither KOS nor PTTis an acronym.
17Extensive motivation for this view of QUD can be found in Fernández (2006)
and Ginzburg (2012), based primarily on semantic and syntactic paralleism in
non-sentential utterances such as short answers, sluicing, and various other non-
sentential utterances.
18Thus, the focus establishing constituent in the QUD associated with a wh-query
will be the wh-phrase utterance, the focus establishing constituent in the QUD
emerging from a quantificational utterance will be the NP utterance, whereas the
focus establishing constituent in a QUD accommodated in a clarification context
will be the sub-utterance under clarification
TABLE 2 | Dialogue Gameboard.
Component Type
Spkr Individual keeps track of Turn
Addr Individual ownership
utt-time Time
Facts Set(propositions) Shared assumptions
VisualSit Situation Visual scene
Moves List(Locutionary propositions) Grounded utterances
QUD Partially ordered Live
set(〈question, FEC〉) issues
Pending List(Locutionary propositions) Ungrounded utterances
taking place, the Interaction Situation is dynamically updated by
recording pairs
〈utterance event, utterance type 〉
where an utterance type is the equivalent of a sign in
sign-based grammars such as Head Driven Phrase Structure
Grammar (HPSG, Pollard and Sag, 1994; Ginzburg and
Sag, 2000; Sag et al., 2003), Categorial Grammar (see e.g.,
Calder et al., 1988; Moortgat, 1997), or in versions of
Lexical Functional Grammar (see e.g., Muskens, 2001). A
pair 〈u,Tu〉 indicating the occurrence of an utterance event
u of type Tu is called a locutionary proposition. For
instance, suppose that A utters (30a). Then Pending is updated
by recording the locutionary proposition in (30b), stating
the occurrence of utterance event ubk of type Say(A, Bo
kowtowed?).
(30) a. A: Bo kowtowed?
b. 〈ubk, Say(A, Bo kowtowed?) 〉
In fact, in versions of Interaction Grammar like KOS or PTT every
sub-utterance of ubk expressing a constituent of ubk gets recorded
as a separate locutionary proposition: e.g., the utterance event
ukowtow of uttering the word kowtow.
(31) a. A: Bo kowtowed?
b. 〈uBo, Say(A, ‘Bo’) 〉
c. 〈ukowtow, Say(A, ‘kowtow’) 〉
Wewill assume in this paper two main types of verbal interaction
events–Say and Ask–as well a few other non-verbal interaction
events discussed below.
5.2.1. Other Repair
As we discussed in Section 3.3, the grammar makes available
various constructions whose primary function is to request
clarification about prior utterances. We discuss here two cases—
for detailed formal analysis see Ginzburg and Sag (2000), Purver
(2006), and Ginzburg (2012).
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An analysis of sentential reprises such as (32) involves a
construction which, via reference to the interaction event, builds
a content in the following way: the maximally pending utterance
serves as the proposition from which a question is formed,
indicated here using the notation ?p—zero or more argument
roles are queried, corresponding to referential elements that
cannot be resolved in context:19
(32) a. A: Do you like Hrvati? B: Do I like what?
b. MaxPending utterance content for A: Ask(A,?like(B,h))
c. MaxPending utterance content for B: Ask(A,?like(B,x))
(B cannot resolve x)20
d. Content of B’s clarification question:
?x Ask(A,?like(B,x)).
For an utterance like (33a), we need to say more about the
reasoning an interlocutor makes when posing a clarification
question. We assume that after every utterance the addressee
engages in monitoring the incoming utterance u0: if she thinks
she understands it—she can classify u0 with a fully instantiated
sign, she responds accordingly; if not, taking as input her
partially instantiated locutionary proposition, she has a right
to accommodate into the context one of a small number of
questions concerning any sub-utterance of u0 (Ginzburg and
Cooper, 2004; Purver, 2006; Ginzburg, 2012). Thus, for any sub-
utterance u1, the grammar enables reference to the question
‘what did prev-spkr mean by u1’ constrained by segmental
phonological parallelism with u1. In other words, we assume
the existence of a construction whereby a phrase segmentally
identical to a sub-utterance u1 of the previous utterance can
express a question like (33b):
(33) a. A: Did Bo kowtow? B: kowtow?
b. ?x.Mean(A, ukowtow, x) (“what did A mean by uttering
‘kowtow’? ”)
What price do we need to pay to develop an account like
this one of (33a)? The main cost involves the context: via
Sign instantiation and Event type inference we assume
that interlocutors maintain highly structured representations of
utterances to enable them to engage in clarification question
accommodation. Specifically, representations which specify the
morphosyntactic and meaning representation for each sub-
utterance, given the fact that each sub-utterance down to the level
of the word is potentially clarifiable (Poesio, 1995; Poesio and
Muskens, 1997; Purver et al., 2001, 2016; Poesio and Rieser, 2010,
2011).
19 In the limit, no roles are queried and the question is a polar one, posed to confirm
the intended content:
• A: Do you like Hrvati? B: Do I like Hrvati?
• MaxPending utterance content for A: Ask(A,?like(B,h))
• Content of B’s clarification question: ?Ask(A,?like(B,h)) ("Are you asking if I like
Hrvati")
20Here ‘x’ denotes a contextual parameter that B cannot be resolved. For a
technically precise explication of such a notion see Ginzburg (2012).
As far as the grammar goes, the cost is this: the ability to
specify constructions which make reference to elements of QUD.
This latter requirement is currently supported by much evidence
(Ginzburg, 1994, 2012; Roberts, 1996, 2004).
5.2.2. Quotation
Given the ubiquity of quotation in natural language, linguists
need to explicate the mechanisms it employs. Indeed, as we
suggested earlier, one is obligated to do so in a way that offers
an answer to the question: why, rather than being a heterodox
linguistic process, is in fact quotation so straightforward?
The short answer, we suggest, is that this is because quotation
involves entities and mechanisms utilized ubiquitously during
dialogue processing. In other words, sign instantiation.
How does this apply to quotation? Ginzburg and Cooper
(2014) postulate that pure quotations denote signs and direct
quotations denote locutionary propositions. We illustrate how
this applies to direct quotation briefly.
Direct quotation involves providing a demonstration of a
previous communicative act u (or in extreme cases a sound or
gesture act imbued with communicative intent) (de Cornulier,
1978; Clark and Gerrig, 1990)21. What varies with context
is how similar the demonstration is going to be to u (does
the demonstration use the same language? does it filter away
disfluencies? how close in terms of content is it to u?).
By representing a direct quotation in terms of u (the original
act) and T (the type corresponding to the demonstration), we can
specify the similarity required in context.
A predicate embedding a direct quotation like English ‘like,’
‘go,’ or French ‘faire’ is then posited to select for a locutionary
proposition (u,T) and to predicate of the content of u. Thus, in
(34a), A makes an utterance in French including the hesitation
marker ‘euh’. B reports this utterance in English using the
utterance ‘No way I’ll do it’ which has filtered away the hesitation
and whose content B views to be sufficiently similar to uA, A’s
utterance
(34) a. Je le ferai euh genre absolument pas.
I it do-future uh like absolutely not.
‘ I’ll do it uh like no way’
b. content(uA)= Not(Do(A,d))
c. B: He went ‘like no way I’ll do it’.
d. B’s direct quotation of A: Say(B,
Say(A,(uA,T‘no way I′ll do it′ )).
5.2.3. Own Communication Management
Dealing with OCM does not require much change as far
as context goes: the monitoring and update/clarification cycle
is modified to happen at the end of each word utterance
event—or in principle more frequently Brennan and Schober
(2001)—, and in case of the need for change, a clarification
21As Ray Jackendoff (p.c.) reminds us, this need not hold for negative (‘She never
said ‘ . . . ’ ’) or hypothetical (‘If I ask ‘. . . ’ ’) direct quotations. This is an instance
of a more general interaction between negation, conditionalization, and event
reference.
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question gets accommodated into QUD. Overt examples for such
accommodation is exemplified in (35).
(35) a. Carol: Well it’s (pause) it’s (pause) er (pause) what’s his
name? Bernard Matthews’ turkey roast. (BNC, KBJ)
b. A: Here we are in this place, what’s its name? Australia.
The answer to this question is then used as the alteration and
this triggers an update of the representation of the utterance
(Ginzburg et al., 2014).
While the contextual background to OCM requires little
change to the view of context outlined previously, accounting
for OCM requires considerable changes in the outlook of the
grammar. Specifically, it requires
1. an incremental and non-monotonic view of utterance
construction.
2. ‘non-grammatical’ speech events to be incorporated within
the domain of the grammar.
This latter assumption is required since words and collocations
that constitute ‘editing phrases’ (e.g., ‘No’, ‘Or’, ‘I mean’) select for
utterance events which can contain ‘ungrammatical’ aspects.
Hence, the status of the grammar shifts radically, potentially
in line with views that argue for intrinsic gradience (Lau et al.,
2016)22. It now characterizes as ‘well formed’ speech events that
contain ill formed parts, albeit ones that have been corrected, for
instance the German/Hebrew ones in (36a,c); a native speaker
can distinguish these from potential utterances such as (36b,e,f)
with no corrections or where the correction has gone awry:
(36) a. der der die Batterie die versorgt nur im Notfall.
art-masc art-masc art-fem Battery-fem it powers only in case-of-need.
‘the the the battery it powers only in case of need’ (example (20), Fox et al. (2010))
b. *die die der Batterie die versorgt nur im Notfall.
art-fem art-fem art-masc Battery-fem it powers only in case-of-need.
‘the the the battery it powers only in case of need’
c. kaxa she hi amda he’emida oto leyad ha-luax.
So compl-decl she stood stood-causative it near def-blackboard.
‘In such a way that she stood placed it near the blackboard’ (example (26), Fox et al. (2010))
d. * kaxa she hi amda oto leyad ha-luax.
So compl-decl she stood it near def-blackboard.
‘In such a way that she stood it near the blackboard’
e. * kaxa she hi he’emida amda oto leyad ha-luax.
So compl-decl she stood-causative stood it near def-blackboard.
‘In such a way that she placed stood it near the blackboard’.
22Also relevant in this respect are pivot constructions discussed in Norén and Linell
(2013); frequent in conversation, neither self–, nor other–corrected, violating basic
selectional principles:
(i) E: oh that’s what I’d like to have is a fresh one. (Norén and Linell, 2013,
example 1).
5.2.4. Interjections and Turn Assignment
Consider a word like ‘marh. abteyn.’ As we discussed in Section
3.1, this word is used as a response greeting by Bilal just in case
the initial greeting by Awda was ‘marh. aba.’
In a grammar which enables reference to the interaction event,
this is easy to capture: such a word has a presupposition about the
form and content of the previously grounded move, that its form
was ‘marh. aba’ and content a greeting.
What of turn assignment utterances, as in (16)? As with
greetings, in a grammar that allows reference to the interaction
event, which tracks turn holders, an utterance which expresses a
wish about a projected turn holder is easy to encode.
5.3. Non-sentential Utterances
In Section 3.1, we pointed out that the content one assigns
to a non-sentential utterance like ‘four croissants’ can
vary widely, with the sources for the different contents
ranging from a previously uttered question through domain–
specificity and to a correction. We have also emphasized
that different non-sentential utterance constructions exhibit
morphosyntactic and/or phonological parallelism with their
antecedents, which in the case of short answers can be
maintained across multiple turns. This means that not
only does the combinatorial semantics of non-sentential
utterance constructions integrate information from the
Dialogue GameBoard, but that this is also potentially true
of the morphosyntactic and phonological specifications of such
constructions. Such information needs to be projected into
the context, as we have already observed in the case of repair
constructions, maintained, in parallel with QUD–oriented
information.
We claim that it is only with a theory of interaction
that structures the context appropriately that we can capture
the uniformity underlying such utterances. We do so via a
construction type, as in (37e) which generalizes a rule proposed
already in Hausser and Zaefferer (1979). Its content field
involves the following predication: the predicate is the question
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under discussion, whereas the subject is the bare non-sentential
utterance; the rule’s syntactic specification requires that the non-
sentential utterance bears the same syntactic category as its
antecedent in QUD, the focus establishing constituent (fec):
(37) a. B: Four croissants.
b. (Context: A: What did you buy in the bakery?) Content:
I bought four croissants in the bakery.
c. (Context: A: (smiles at B, who has become the next
customer to be served at the bakery.)) Content: I would
like to buy four croissants.
d. (Context: A: Dad bought four crescents.) Content: You
mean that Dad bought four croissants.
e. Declarative-fragment-clause:
Cont= DGB.MaxQUD(unsu.cont)
unsu.cat=MaxQUD.fec.cat : Syncat.
For a detailed analysis of a wide range of NSU constructions
found in the BNC see Fernández (2006) and Ginzburg (2012).
What of cases such as (27), repeated here as (38)? The answers
get introduced into the semantics via mechanisms discussed
in Lücking et al. (2015), whereas the question via domain
specific (or alternatively genre–based) inference (Larsson, 2002;
Ginzburg, 2012)23.
(38) a. Owner: (displays three fresh fish on a platter) Clark:
(points at one of them) (From Clark (2012): example
(32))
b. Owner: (displays three fresh fish on a platter) Clark:
(points at one of them) That one.
5.4. Order-Dependent Expressions
One of the key theoretical assumptions listed in Section 5.1 is
that the Interaction Situation includes a locutionary proposition
for every single word. Using this assumption we can provide an
exhaustive account of order-dependent expressions.
Using the notation introduced above 〈u,8〉 to state that
utterance event u is of type 8, and assuming a function ;
mapping utterance events to their content, we can say that the
result of uttering the NP Bob is to update the current utterance
(the maximal element of Pending) by adding to it the two
conditions in (39). The first one records the utterance u by A of
the word-string “Bob”; the second one records that the content of
the utterance event e is the object denoted by b. (We assume here
a ‘natural’ semantics for proper names as proposed by Partee,
together with type raising operations.) Subsequent utterances of
the expressions and, John, etc. update the common ground in a
similar fashion, by adding new utterance events preceded by e.
23The essential idea of these proposals is that a given domain/genre can be
characterized, in part, by a partially ordered set of questions, discussion of which
constitutes its defining subject matter. At appropriate points these questions can be
deduced as relevant and accommodated into QUD without being uttered overtly.
For instance, in a customer/client interaction, the issue ‘what does the client
require’ can become QUD-maximal.
(39) {〈u,Say(A,“Bob”)〉, u ; b }
It should be easy to see how the framework just sketched can be
used to specify the interpretation of order-dependent expressions
like the former one and vice versa. The meaning of the two
expressions can in fact be characterized as follows:
the former one The content of an event of uttering an NP of the
form the former N is that element x of a set X of familiar objects
which is also the content of the first utterance event u1 among
those used to introduce the elements of X24.
The required constraints on the Interaction Situation are
imposed by assigning to former the following interpretation. Say
that u is an event of saying “former”:
(40) 〈u,Say(A,“former”)〉
The interpretation of u consists a ’linguistic’ part (the content
of u) and a ‘metalinguistic’ one. This second part imposes
conditions on the Interaction Situation: namely, the requirement
that two events of uttering nominals u1 and u2 occurred in the
interaction event, u1 preceding u2 and having content x. The
first part then specifies that the content of the utterance of the
adjective former is a predicate modifier specifying the restriction
that the object to which the predicate is applied must be equal
to x.
vice versa The content of an event of uttering the string vice
versa conjoined with an utterance with contextually specified
constituents u1 . . . un is obtained by applying the usual rules of
semantic interpretation to combine the contents of u1 . . . un, after
having switched two contextually specified utterance events ui
and uj that are part of u1 . . . un. For instance, in the case of
(15b) in Section 3.2.3, I think actors can teach dancers a lot,
and vice versa, the content of the event of uttering vice versa,
which is conjoined with the contextually specified sequence of
events u1 . . . u6 of uttering actors1 can2 teach3 dancers4 a5 lot6, is
obtained by applying the usual rules of semantic composition to
the sequence obtained by switching u1, actors, with u4, dancers.
5.5. Anaphora
We have shown in, e.g., Poesio and Rieser (2010) and Poesio
and Rieser (2011), that by adopting an interactionist approach
to grammar the examples discussed in Section 3.2.1 can be
analyzed within a treatment of anaphora that is a natural
extension of Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle,
1993) and is closely related to, e.g., the proposals in Asher and
Lascarides (2003). In such extensions, updating the Interaction
Situation with new locutionary or illocutionary events makes new
discourse referents available just as events are in the situation
under discussion. As a result, implicit anaphoric references such
as those in (41a), repeated here for convenience, can be handled
precisely as shown in (41b), which specifies the occurrence
in the interaction situation of two speech acts ce1 and ce2
(conversational events in PTT). These two speech acts are related
by a concession rhetorical relation.
24 The meanings of events of uttering the latter N, the first N, . . . the last N, the
former one, etc. are specified in a similar way.
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(41) a. Although MSG [Monosodium Glutamate] has been
blamed for a variety of symptoms, it has been vindicated
by scientific research.
b. 〈ce1, assert(writer, ‘MSG has been blamed for a variety
of symptoms”)〉,
〈ce2, assert(writer, ‘MSG has been vindicated by
scientific research’)〉,
concession(ce1,ce2)
Within this framework, explicit references to illocutionary acts as
in (42b), where that is a reference to the (speech) act of promising
in (42a), can be handled similarly as the implicit references to
such events found in SDRT:
(42) a. A: John, I promise I will help you with your homework.
〈ce1, promise(A,‘A will help John with his homework’)〉
b. B: That was silly, as you won’t have any time.
〈ce2, assert(B,‘ce1 was silly as A won’t have any time’)〉
The references to locutionary events as in the example from
Webber (1991) ‘4’ can be analyzed in a similar way provided we
assume that not only illocutionary events, but locutionary events
as well, are part of the interaction event:
(43) a. A: The combination is 1-2-3-4.
b. 〈u1, Say(A,“the combination is 1-2-3-4”)〉
c. B: Could you repeat that? I didn’t hear it.
d. 〈u2, Say(B,“could you repeat u1? I didn’t hear u1’)〉
5.6. Pointing and Gestures
A grammatical framework in which grammar imposes
constraints on the Interaction Situation is naturally suited
to specify grammatical constraints on other aspects of
communication such as gestures and pointing, as these are
just other types of events whose occurrence is recorded in the
Interaction Situation. In Rieser and Poesio (2009) we proposed
that propositions of the form
〈g,G(A)〉
where G is a type of gesture, are recorded in the Interaction
Situation to indicate the performance of a grammatically relevant
type of gesture by A. An example of grammatically relevant
gesture is pointing:
〈p,point(A)〉
(from which we can indirectly infer, following the type of
reasoning studied by Lücking et al., that
〈p,point-at(A,φ,)〉
A multimodal grammar for the integration of pointing and
speech based on this treatment of gestures in the Interaction
Situation was proposed in Poesio and Rieser (2009). Clearly,
the framework could also be used to provide an account of
gestures referring to other aspects of the Interaction Event–e.g.,
for turn-taking.
6. DISCUSSION
6.1. The Initial Data Revisited:
Contextualizing Compositionality
We started the paper by using two real dialogues to illustrate the
challenges that interaction poses for contemporary grammars. In
Section 5 we then proposed a number of principles that enable
grammars to analyze spoken language and sketched accounts of
various phenomena introduced in Section 3. To what extent do
these help with the initial dialogues from Section 1?
6.1.1. Disfluencies
Our preferred terminology is own management communication,
which emphasizes the intentional and useful nature of such
phenomena. We provided an example of the type of approach
that explicates their coherence and situates them within the
ubiquitous aspects of utterance processing.
6.1.2. Non Sentential Utterances and Interjections
Again, we provided a basic approach here, with references to
highly detailed, formalized accounts elsewhere. The example
account we provide involves constructional/lexical specifications
that can interface directly with dialogue context that contains
both linguistic and non-linguistic information.
6.1.3. Overlapping Turns
We argue that a key desideratum with respect to turn
management is incremental classification of speech events,
as in the example account provided. This account also
emphasizes that each conversationalist has their own view of
the interaction situation—the dialogue gameboard. These are
important ingredients in tackling this phenomenon, that will
have to be provided in a proper account.
6.1.4. Ad hoc Coinages
We have emphasized as a key principle that grammars are
open and non-global. This is crucial for acquisition, repair, and
quotation. We have scratched the surface with respect to this in
our discussion of the latter two.
6.1.5. Compositionality
In Section 1 we argue that the grammars need to encode a view
of compositionality whereby meaning emerges by combining
information from the interaction situation, speech events, and
gestures. One very simple example of such a notion—sans
gestures—is given in our rule for declarative fragments given in
(37) in which both meaning composition and morphosyntactic
parallelism are driven by the dialogue gameboard. For rules
integrating gesture in a similar framework, see e.g., Lücking
(2016).
6.2. Moving the Boundary between
Competence and Performance
Let us assume, initially, for argument’s sake that a
competence/performance distinction is tenable as the basis
for a theory of the human language faculty. What we have shown
in this paper is that the boundary as commonly drawn is entirely
artificial as it leaves out a host of key aspects of interaction that
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are clearly governed by ‘grammar’ under any sensible notion of
what a ‘grammar’ is.
A secondary but still key aspect of our proposal is that
this redrawing of the boundary does not in any way involve
abandoning the aim of providing a formal account of the
structure and meaning of language in interaction. To be sure,
there is still a lot of work to be done in developing a
formal ‘Interaction Grammar’ framework that may provide as
productive a foundation for theories of the extended notion of
grammatical competence as the ‘standard theory’ that emerged
in the 1970s and 1980s from the work of Chomsky, Montague,
Partee, Bresnan, Sag, and many others. But we believe that for all
its necessary sketchiness the proposal in Section 5 shows what the
essential ingredients of such a formalism would be; much more
detailed developments have appeared in e.g., Ginzburg (2012).
There are two concrete results we can point to. First, we
have demonstrated (building, in part, on insights that have been
around for many years, but have repeatedly been forgotten) that
the disembodied, context independent notion of grammaticality
still much discussed (see e.g., Gibson and Fedorenko, 2013;
Sprouse and Almeida, 2013; Lau et al., 2016) and which serves
as one of the main empirical evaluation criteria for formal
grammars is untenable and must be replaced by a contextually
relativized notion. Second, the accounts we sketch for various
of the phenomena at issue (interjections which presuppose prior
use of other interjections, non-sentential utterances which carry
structural presuppositions, self-repair, quotation) show how such
a notion can be constructed.
The approach we propose here also displays what we hold
to be a key property of any future framework of this type:
i.e., that it doesn’t overly muddy the grammatical baby with
the interactional bathwater, i.e., that it is an extension and a
generalization of the frameworks currently in use so that it does
not require rethinking current grammar theory wholesale, as
for many phenomena there already exist satisfactory accounts.
Also, such an extension and generalization would allow linguists
interested in phenomena that do not appear to involve reference
to the interaction event to use only the formal machinery that is
strictly required.
A third contention we have tried to exemplify throughout
is that redrawing the boundaries this way will make work
on grammar by theoretical linguists much more relevant to
sister disciplines such as computational linguistics, conversation
analysis, corpus linguistics, psycholinguistics, speech processing,
the study of multimodal interaction, or cognitive neuroscience
that in recent years have had to develop their own foundational
frameworks as the formal tools provided by theoretical linguistics
were too limited (Ferreira, 2005; Poeppel and Embick, 2005;
Steedman, 2013).
6.3. The Grammar-Pragmatics Boundary
We expect several readers of this paper will react by saying
‘interesting phenomena, but this is not grammar, it’s pragmatics.’
Charting the semantics/pragmatics boundary is not easy (for
some recent discussions, see Recanati, 2010; Stojanovic, 2013;
Lepore and Stone, 2014 and there are certainly influential
proposals suggesting that pragmatics intrudes in various
incontrovertibly grammatical processes Levinson, 2000; Ariel,
2008). Avoiding these difficult issues here, we note that of the
five classes of phenomena discussed, Grammar across turns,
Online repair, Genre dependent grammar, Speech-gesture
integration are all concerned incontrovertibly with structural
issues or issues of meaning composition. This leaves the class
of phenomena concerned with reference to the interaction
event: we pointed out that other communication management
constitutes the primary/literal meaning of a number of words and
constructions, hence integrating these in grammar is as justified
as integrating tense, which involves ordering relations between a
described event and an utterance event (in our terminology—the
interaction event.).
6.4. The Place of the Sentence in a Theory
of Grammar
In traditional grammar, the notion of ‘sentence’ plays a central
role; indeed, in formal grammars, a grammar is usually defined as
a set of formal rules characterizing the sentences of the language.
An important consequence of the adoption of an interactionist
view is that this centrality needs to be reconsidered. In real
conversations complete sentences without repair are far from
being the rule; moreover, non-sentential utterances of various
kinds are extremely common, as discussed in the previous
sections.
6.5. Rethinking Competence v.
Performance as Black Box v. White Box
Testing
The competence/performance distinction is prima facie attractive
because it enables one to separate analysis of ‘the linguistic
phenomena’ from the specific details of how they get processed.
The problem, we think, is that this reasonable desideratum
has lead to a highly selective and misleading view of what are
the ‘rule governed’ phenomena associated with language. We
think a better construal of this separation could be drawn from
computer science, which offers the distinction between black box
and white box testing (Patton, 2006): the former pertains to the
functionality of an application without peering into its internal
structures or workings, whereas the latter involves trying to assess
functionality, in part, by examining the implemented code.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented compelling evidence to
suggest that the view of grammar thus far predominant in
formal linguistics, which relegates a variety of conversational
phenomena to performance rather than grammatical
competence, results in a overly impoverished view of our
knowledge of language. We have argued for the need for a notion
of grammaticality relativized to interaction situations. This,
in turn, requires grammatical knowledge to be conceptualized
dialogically, i.e., embedded within conversational interaction.
We have also suggested that extending our view of grammar
does not amount to a jump into the unknown: a number of
frameworks are already emerging supplying us with the formal
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tools required to provide accounts of many such phenomena.
Finally, we suggested that while no unified ‘InteractionGrammar’
yet exists, a few common assumptions among these frameworks
can already be identified, which may lead to the development of
such a theory.
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